Journalists have uncovered a channel by which high-precision EU-made gear that's important for the manufacturing of missiles and drones has been making its technique to Russia. How has it been potential for machines made in a Polish manufacturing facility to finish up in Russia's military-industrial complicated?
"However please, in no contract, in no letter – okay, in WhatsApp is okay, however in no contract and in no letter point out the navy or something like that, okay?" Bilal insisted. Bilal is a Turkish citizen who arrange a system for supplying EU-made machine instruments to Russia at the beginning of the full-scale warfare.
I had launched myself as a supervisor at a Russian firm that works with the Russian military-industrial complicated and was in search of an everyday provide of kit for use in manufacturing weapons for the warfare in opposition to Ukraine. Bilal's curiosity was immediately captured.
This story started on the finish of 2025. Journalists from StateWatch had been analysing customs information with regard to provides of sanctioned gear from the EU to Russia – gear that’s used to fabricate missiles, Shahed drones and different weapons deployed by the aggressor state on the entrance line and in opposition to civilians.
Among the many tens of hundreds of day by day transactions, one enterprise stood out: Famot Pleszew in Poland, an organization with an impeccable status within the EU. For many years, the manufacturing facility has been producing high-precision metalworking machine instruments that may deal with complicated geometric elements that are important in manufacturing parts for missile techniques and unmanned aerial automobiles.
The gear in query falls below HS Codes 8458.11 and 8457.10 – horizontal lathes and multi-functional machining centres, numerically managed. Within the worldwide classification they’re designated as Excessive Precedence Objects – merchandise with a heightened danger that could be utilized in navy manufacturing. The customs information indicated that not less than US$1.2 million value of kit produced by the Polish manufacturing facility had been delivered to Russia throughout the full-scale warfare up till 30 November 2024.
Journalists from the Polish media outlet Frontstory joined the investigation, and the scheme for circumventing sanctions by third nations was steadily unravelled.
Pleszew: a city of machine instruments
A small city of 16,000 folks, Pleszew is basically centred round business. Amongst different vegetation, it’s dwelling to Famot Pleszew, which manufactures Pc Numerically Managed (CNC) machine instruments. The manufacturing facility has been working since 1877 and was privatised in 1999.
It was acquired by DMG Mori, a German-Japanese company based in Tokyo. Famot was renamed DMG Mori Poland in April 2024, however the manufacturing facility continues to be referred to by its previous title in on a regular basis use and in customs paperwork.
The corporate is now the most important producer of machine instruments in Poland and Central Europe. The Pleszew manufacturing facility is present process fast improvement, supplying lathes, vertical milling machines, common milling machines and progressive automation techniques. At current, it employs round 600 folks. It’s also a strategic provider of parts for different vegetation inside the DMG Mori Group.
Between 2017 and 2021, Russia began shopping for up machine instruments from the EU. Roughly half of those provides got here from Germany. About half of the recognized machine instruments in Russia have been additionally of German origin.
Information from Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) signifies that the most important variety of German-made machines – 148 models – have been produced by DMG Mori Seiki. Not less than 36 such machines are in use at UEC Saturn PJSC, a Rostec-owned firm that produces engines for cruise missiles and navy plane.
The machines have been largely imported by a Moscow-registered firm, DMG Mori Rus LLC. Deliveries continued even after the beginning of the full-scale warfare, that means the corporate maintained its consultant workplace in Russia.
In the summertime of 2022, the Russian subsidiary provided machine parts to UEC Saturn, after which Ukraine's Nationwide Company on Corruption Prevention added DMG Mori to the listing of worldwide sponsors of warfare. On the time, the company acknowledged that it had exited the Russian market and had no involvement within the provides. This isn’t solely correct, because the investigators recognized over US$1.2 million value of such transactions.
St Petersburg: a cigar firm with defence business contracts
On 19 July 2024, vertical metalworking centres value greater than US$100,000 have been imported into Russia. The customs paperwork contained the usual wording: "Not for navy use." The nation of origin was Poland, and the producer was Famot Pleszew Sp. z o.o. In accordance with the labelling, these machines are on the EU's listing of excessive precedence objects that could be utilized in weapons manufacturing.
The recipient was a Russian firm, Saturn EK LLC, which relies in St Petersburg and has been on the US sanctions listing since 2023. Its founder and director, Anna Ivanova, can also be the proprietor and director of Edlaud LLC (meals retail) and the director of Havana Cigar Membership LLC (tobacco gross sales). Judging by Ivanova's social media, she regularly travels overseas to conduct wakesurfing coaching programs and is almost certainly a entrance particular person.
Till 2016, Yuri Skrotsky was listed within the Russian register of authorized entities because the founding father of Saturn EK. He’s additionally the proprietor of GK Snabzheniye LLC, which he co-owns with Vladimir Gavrilov and Dmitri Arkhipov. The latter are additionally co-owners of the aforementioned Havana Cigar Membership, the place Ivanova serves as director. All these corporations are due to this fact interconnected.
Based mostly on the information accessible (public procurement in Russia turned non-transparent after the beginning of the full-scale warfare), GK Snabzheniye repeatedly fulfilled state contracts value a whole lot of hundreds of thousands of roubles. Its largest shoppers have been:
- Concern Morinformsystem-Agat JSC, a Russian shipbuilding firm specialising within the improvement, manufacturing and upkeep of fight data and management techniques, in addition to built-in techniques for the automated command of naval formations and fireplace management techniques for cruise and ballistic missiles
- Izumrud JSC, a developer of radar gear
- Methods of Precision Instrument Making Scientific and Manufacturing Company JSC, certainly one of Russia's main defence business corporations, which produces aviation techniques utilized in Su-27 navy plane and Ka-52 assault helicopters
- Novosibirsk Instrument-Constructing Plant JSC, a Russian producer of small arms and surveillance optics which is a part of the Rostec Company
- Shtil Hydroacoustic Communications Analysis Institute (NII Gidrosvyazi Shtil) JSC, the one firm in Russia specialising within the improvement of hydroacoustic communication techniques and hydroacoustic search and rescue techniques for the Russian Navy.
All these corporations have been sanctioned by numerous nations resulting from their involvement in Russia's warfare in opposition to Ukraine.
Previous to 24 February 2022, GK Snabzheniye positioned itself as a extremely certified provider of digital parts and modules from main international producers (Altera, Xilinx, Analog Gadgets, Texas Devices and Atmel, whose merchandise are utilized in Russian missiles and drones to at the present time).
The corporate's official web site was taken down in 2022. Information from the Russian authorized register Fedresurs signifies that in July 2022, GK Snabzheniye leased gear manufactured by DMG Mori.
After the full-scale warfare began, GK Snabzheniye provided gear to the Polyot radio plant in Chelyabinsk, which produces aviation gear, together with for the Russian Ministry of Defence. That is acknowledged in a ruling by the Chelyabinsk Oblast Arbitration Court docket.
On 25 December 2023, the court docket partially granted a declare in a case regarding a big contract inside the framework of the state defence procurement programme. The court docket discovered that GK Snabzheniye had provided items value US$868,000 to the Polyot radio plant. The ruling additionally lists the supply dates below the defence contract.
It’s clear that the people related with Saturn EK are additionally linked to Russia's defence contracts. One other oblique piece of proof is the dramatic enchancment seen within the firm's monetary outcomes after the full-scale warfare started.
Excessive-precision gear from Famot Pleszew was provided to Saturn EK by a Turkish firm, OTL Uluslararasi Dis Ticaret Restricted Sirketi, which has been sanctioned by the EU, Ukraine and Switzerland since 2025.
In accordance with the sanctions authorities, the corporate is concerned in re-export schemes used to hide the Russian finish recipients. The corporate has imported US$2.5 million value of merchandise into Russia throughout the years of the full-scale warfare.
Domodedovo: corks with defence business ambitions
In accordance with the accessible customs information (as much as and together with March 2025), the final supply of kit manufactured by Famot Pleszew occurred on 30 November 2024. The worth of the cargo was virtually US$82,000. The gear in query was a horizontal CNC turning and milling machine manufactured in 2017. It was declared to be "for non-military functions".
The recipient was Kortisa (or Cortiça) LLC, an organization registered in 2023 in Domodedovo close to Moscow. In accordance with Russian company registers, the corporate specialises within the manufacturing of plywood, wood boards and panels, however in keeping with the corporate's web site, it makes wood corks.
In idea, the horizontal CNC turning and milling machine delivered throughout the full-scale warfare may very well be used to course of wooden.
In apply, nonetheless, it could be ridiculous each technologically and economically to make use of gear designed for metal and titanium, with cooling techniques, a inflexible construction and industrial-level hundreds, to supply an unusual wood cork. Machines of this sort are designed to fabricate shafts, bushings, housings and sophisticated parts with micron-level precision. They’re meant for heavy engineering, not woodworking.
Regardless of formally having solely two staff, Kortisa reported income of just about RUB 100 million (roughly US$1 million) in 2024.
The investigators found one other firm within the Russian register of authorized entities with an identical title to Kortisa: Kortis LLC, which provides machine instruments and gear from overseas. The corporate specialises "primarily in state and municipal procurement". Merchandise from DMG Mori have appeared on its web site.
The corporate's revenues soared after 2022 and now quantity to billions of roubles. Earlier than the full-scale warfare, supplies in regards to the DMG Mori Academy in Russia have been posted on this web site.
In accordance with the customs information, the declarant is listed as Dmitry Kurashov, who is known as as the corporate's common director on its web site. As well as, in keeping with the Russian register of authorized entities, he’s additionally the proprietor and director of Kortis.
Istanbul: don't point out the navy and all the things might be tremendous
It stays unclear whether or not this specific machine instrument was provided to a enterprise that manufactures weapons for the warfare or cooperates with Russia's military-industrial complicated. Nonetheless, the investigators recognized the Turkish middleman firm – Pyramid Muhendislik Ticaret Restricted Sirketi – which provided the Polish Famot gear to Kortisa.
In accordance with the knowledge on its web site, the corporate was registered in Istanbul in 2011, however in keeping with the Turkish register, it was established in Might 2023 by Bilal Ipek.
The corporate's web site lists Bilal's contact particulars in one of many messaging apps. A journalist instantly dialled the quantity, posing because the supervisor of a Russian firm that works intently with the Russian military-industrial complicated.
The phone dialog with Bilal started within the regular means however shortly moved to the delicate topic of sanctions and navy contracts. After a quick introduction, the journalist defined the aim of her name.
"Our firm provides gear for the navy in Russia, and we’re at present looking for suppliers of European gear resulting from well-known scenario if what I imply. We’re looking for a CNC machine instrument for our work, mannequin CLX-350, Famot."
With out lacking a beat, Bilal instantly requested for extra particulars.
"You need new one or used one?"
After listening to that both possibility could be potential, he swiftly moved on to the primary concern.
"And what in regards to the cost switch? You realize there may be sanctions?"
The journalist reassured him: "We’ll attempt to discover a answer. We’ve companions in different nations who can switch cash to your organization."
The Turkish supervisor then outlined his personal expertise in getting around the restrictions.
"Generally I work with different Russian corporations additionally. I work with one financial institution. Generally we’re allowed to convey the cash from the financial institution as roubles. I additionally bought CNC machines to Russia final yr. I purchased them in Europe and organized the export switch. Ultimately we bought them. There are brokers, do you perceive?"
The journalist talked about the CLX-350 made by Famot. Bilal confirmed that he was conversant in the model, however requested for clarification of the configuration and even prompt an alternate. Then he stipulated a key situation for cooperation. "However please, in no contract, in no letter – okay, in WhatsApp is okay, however in no contract and in no letter point out the navy or something like that, okay?"
Bilal despatched a listing of the gear that was in inventory and accessible on the market. Many of the objects on the listing have been labelled as DMG Mori merchandise.
Bilal stated supplying new gear from DMG Mori could be troublesome, however nonetheless potential. Furthermore, he confirmed that it had been carried out earlier than.
Thus, the Turkish provider confirmed that he had expertise of supplying EU-manufactured machine instruments to Russia after the introduction of sanctions and was keen to hunt out monetary options by banks and brokers, and emphasised the necessity to keep away from any point out of the navy goal of the gear in official paperwork.
Journalists from Frontstory despatched inquiries to the Polish plant and its mum or dad firm. DMG Mori responded that it couldn’t rule out the likelihood that third events might have bought gear and illegally exported it.
The response acknowledged: "As a producer of machine instruments, we take decided motion in opposition to the unauthorised relocation of machines. Because of this, we developed RMS know-how. RMS stands for 'Relocation Machine Safety': a sensor makes it potential to detect the relocation of a machine instrument and mechanically disables the machine. It will probably solely be put again into operation on the new location as soon as it has been launched by a DMG MORI service technician.
We developed the RMS know-how in Japan a few years in the past, repeatedly refined it, and have steadily deployed it all through the world. Since 1 January 2024, all DMG MORI machines worldwide are geared up with RMS as commonplace. We’re neither capable of hint nor management the whereabouts of older machines that don’t have RMS."
Regardless of DMG Mori's official statements that it utterly withdrew from the Russian market again in 2022, high-precision machine instruments from the Polish plant in Pleszew proceed to achieve Russia by Turkish intermediaries specialising in sanctions circumvention.
The Turkish merchants explicitly recommend schemes to hide the navy goal of the gear within the documentation, whereas the tip recipients in Russia are shell corporations related with state contracts for key companies inside the military-industrial complicated. This demonstrates that there’s a systemic vulnerability within the EU sanctions regime with regard to dual-use merchandise.
Translated by Anna Kybukevych and Tetiana Buchkovska
Edited by Teresa Pearce
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