Lately, the Kremlin has sought to solid Russia as a bastion of so-called conventional values, positioning itself in stark distinction to what it describes because the morally decaying West. But beneath this veneer, a extra complicated actuality persists. As exiled Russian thinker Alexey Zhavoronkov instructed the Kyiv Impartial, “conservative rhetoric and ideas are employed to masks a unique actuality.”
Inside the framework of conventional conservative thought, private liberty is considered a foundational precept. However in right this moment’s Russia, such freedom is markedly absent.
As Zhavoronkov observes, these advancing the narrative of a “conservative” Russia ceaselessly accomplish that much less out of ideological conviction than opportunism — aligning themselves with the Kremlin to function de facto spokespeople for President Vladimir Putin’s regime whereas additionally enriching themselves.
Amongst these ceaselessly cited as mental architects of the Kremlin’s “conventional values” worldview is Alexander Dugin, referred to in Western media as “Putin’s mind” — a title that belies the ambiguous and sure overstated nature of his precise affect.
Dugin, who has overtly referred to as for the genocide of Ukrainians and maintains a community geared toward exporting his ideology far and large overseas, presents himself as a thinker. However as exiled Zhavoronkov defined to the Kyiv Impartial, Dugin's work is marred by mental incoherence and lacks the philosophical depth required for severe consideration.
This interview has been edited for size and readability.
The Kyiv Impartial: Some right-wing contingents within the West declare that Russia is a final holdout for “conventional values.” May you go into extra element concerning the picture that Russia is attempting to undertaking versus what is basically taking place there?
Alexey Zhavoronkov: This idea of “conventional values” — and by that I imply the political use of the idea of conventional values — could be very illustrative as a result of there are a whole bunch of its interpretations in several paperwork and publications. If we have a look at official paperwork like Russian nationwide improvement methods, which provide lists of particular “conventional values,” most of those values aren’t strictly conservative. We see notions like particular person freedom, or we see one thing extra related to the philosophy of enlightenment (like the concept of human dignity) — that means that conventional values are extra alongside the traces of liberal thought. There are additionally sure ideas, resembling collectivism, that had been carried over from the Soviet interval.
Conservative values talked about in Russian official paperwork are largely centered round ‘conventional household’ — past that, there isn’t a lot. This serves as an excellent instance of how conservative rhetoric and ideas — generally even borrowed from Western traditions, that are formally condemned in Russia — are employed to masks a unique actuality.
If we have a look at the conservative custom within the U.S. and evaluate it to the Russian custom, the variations are putting — they’re two fully totally different worlds.
The Kyiv Impartial: How so?
Alexey Zhavoronkov: The variations exist on many ranges, together with political apply. But when we begin with the theoretical facet, the Anglo-American conservative custom has a protracted and deep historical past. It doesn’t start as a response to the French Revolution (within the 18th century), however fairly might be traced again to Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-century England. There’s loads to look at when analyzing this custom.
There was no main rupture within the American conservative custom after World Battle II. In distinction, the Bolshevik Revolution (in 1917) in Russia successfully severed the continuity of the nation’s conservative custom. Within the U.S., there have definitely been political crises throughout the conservative motion, however the improvement of the custom was by no means interrupted. Furthermore, within the U.S., after World Battle II, a lot of the conservative motion was outlined by anti-communism. General, if we have a look at main themes and the political insurance policies related to them, there’s little or no overlap between the Russian and American traditions.
Russia sees itself as having a novel position on this planet — it believes it ought to save the world, however it is going to reserve it by way of destruction.
The Russian custom confronted a number of points that differentiated it from the American custom — which itself had inner issues, such because the cut up between neoconservatives and paleoconservatives because the Seventies. I’ll return to that later, as a result of I feel there are some similarities between American and Russian neoconservatives, although solely on the degree of the worldwide political agenda.
As I discussed, in Russia, we see a significant interruption within the conservative custom. There was definitely a conservative custom earlier than the revolution, although by the tip of the Nineteenth century, it was already in decline. It’s additionally fairly telling that as quickly because the Russian (imperial) authorities, underneath Emperor Alexander III, formally adopted conservative rhetoric, conservatism as an mental motion virtually disappeared. The federal government wasn’t excited by severe programmatic works; it solely wanted slogans, which had been largely equipped by the official press.
There have been a plethora of newspapers and a few journals that labeled themselves as conservative, however there have been nearly no mental platforms for Russian conservatives. The golden period of Russian conservatism — related to the Slavophile motion within the mid-Nineteenth century — was already lengthy gone. It wasn’t revived later underneath Emperor Nicholas II, after which got here the revolution. After that, there have been solely restricted makes an attempt to revitalize the conservative custom in the course of the Soviet interval, by figures like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for example. There have been additionally some extra radical conservative, largely Orthodox, actions in the course of the Soviet interval. However apart from just a few collections of essays and Solzhenitsyn’s publications, there have been no main works that could possibly be thought of important mental manifestos. So we’re left to piece collectively fragments from numerous texts — texts which might be neither philosophical in nature nor structured as political packages.
I feel the final really significant mental alternate between Russian conservatives and Russian liberals was the talk between Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov within the Seventies and Nineteen Eighties. Each of them had clearly outlined (however incompatible) visions of Russia’s future.
Many facets of that debate are both not related or problematic, resembling Solzhenitsyn’s thought of the nation. However nonetheless, it was a real (direct and oblique) debate that highlighted basic variations in how every thinker envisioned Russia’s path ahead over the approaching century.
The Kyiv Impartial: Why do you assume the Russian authorities following the us’s collapse, selected the trail of neoconservatism?
Alexey Zhavoronkov: I feel if we return to the difficulty of custom, it’s clear that there was a break in its continuity. Opposite to what the Russian authorities suggests, this custom has not been restored. As an alternative, the federal government is trying one thing just like what American anti-traditionalist neoconservatives aimed to do beginning within the Nineteen Eighties — particularly, to formulate a world political agenda primarily based totally on the nation's nationwide pursuits fairly than on worldwide agreements and guidelines. These nationwide pursuits are used to justify what I’d describe as aggressive, even imperialist, insurance policies geared toward establishing or sustaining dominance in numerous areas of the world.
In fact, the financial weight of a rustic just like the U.S. is incomparably larger than that of Russia. Russia represents solely a small fraction of the worldwide financial system and is now largely remoted from many worldwide markets. Due to this fact, the Russian authorities needed to give you a unique form of justification for its imperial ambitions.
This justification has taken on a radical Orthodox kind. That is the place figures like Alexander Dugin come into play, together with many different ideologists who popularized the idea of “Katechon”— which has turn into one of many key notions in Russian politics right this moment.
The Kyiv Impartial: May you clarify what that’s?
Alexey Zhavoronkov: This idea enforces the concept Russia is the world’s sole and final protector towards the Antichrist. As an alternative of American political and financial exceptionalism, which is manifested in (U.S. President Donald) Trump’s insurance policies, Russia has its personal type of exceptionalism, however with totally different pillars supporting the ideology. For the U.S., the pillar is financial dominance, as seen in Trump’s obsession with tariffs. For Russia, the pillar is non secular or radical Orthodoxy, which comprises robust components of messianism. Russia sees itself as having a novel position on this planet — it believes it ought to save the world, however it is going to reserve it by way of destruction. And to guard the world, Russia have to be in a continuing state of battle with those that worship the Antichrist, particularly with the ‘Collective West.’
The so-called ‘Collective West’ is one other political idea actively utilized in Russian politics. The everlasting state of battle additionally means a everlasting state of exception inside Russia, as a result of battle serves as an ideal justification for nearly any political motion. In such a state of affairs, established guidelines not apply. The federal government can at all times declare that it’s an distinctive circumstance.
The Kyiv Impartial: You talked about Alexander Dugin. May you simply go into who he’s and the way he got here into prominence? Within the West, they name him “Putin's mind.” However his connections to Putin are extremely debated. Does he have any actual affect in Russia or is it simply an outward projection?
Alexey Zhavoronkov: Sure, Dugin is a extremely attention-grabbing determine from the attitude of how he's seen from the West. For a very long time — even in Western political science — he was broadly considered Putin’s favored ideologist, somebody with direct entry to him and the power to advise him on key points. This was, in fact, not the case. And this nonetheless isn't the case right this moment, though Dugin has gained considerably extra favor lately for numerous causes, certainly one of which is the homicide of his daughter.
I feel Dugin is probably probably the most eclectic ideologist in Russia as of right this moment. What he writes is usually eclectic and situational commentary on what the Russian authorities does. On the coronary heart of his “philosophy” is the so-called Fourth Political Principle, a framework supposed to create a brand new political ideology to interchange current ones resembling Liberalism and Marxism. This concept is comprehensible on an elementary degree, however there is no such thing as a mental content material on this concept. It consists solely of slogans about the necessity to set up such a concept, with out providing any clear rationalization of what that concept ought to really be. It's additionally evident that Dugin has no intention of growing it additional, and neither do different ideological figures in Russia, largely because of the nature of Russian politics.
Modern Russian politics — very similar to in the course of the reign of Emperor Alexander III — has no want for mental manifestos. The position of ideologists is basically to retroactively justify actions already taken. Their job is to assert, for instance, that they’ve lengthy supported a selected coverage or alliance, referencing one thing they wrote in a ebook a decade in the past.
The Russian authorities makes use of the technique of fusionism. It has encompassed just about all actions that existed round it. These days, now we have Marxists and Stalinists who assist Putin, but additionally traditionalists like Dugin, fascists, and so forth. It is a wild combine of individuals from numerous backgrounds who, in concept, ought to maintain differing opinions — however in apply, they don’t, no less than not publicly. A lot of them even collaborate inside government-affiliated organizations, such because the Izborsky Membership (a Russian assume tank which Dugin is a member of, amongst others).
What we see in Russia is an eclectic mix of very totally different ideologies, all loosely labeled as conservatism. To raised disguise this inconsistency, Putin — or extra precisely, his speechwriters — sometimes reference conservative literature, generally even theories by Western authors.
Take, for instance, Putin’s speech from October 2021 — just some months earlier than the battle started. In it, there’s a noteworthy part the place he gives a transparent definition of conservatism. Apparently, this definition intently aligns with liberal conservatism as understood by students like Michael Freeden and others. Conservatism, on this context, is portrayed as cautious progress primarily based on rules of wholesome realism and anti-isolationism, a framework of cultural relations that emphasizes respect for various traditions and viewpoints, aversion to extremism, and so forth.
All of the rhetoric about cautious decision-making, anti-isolationism, and respect for others stood in stark distinction to what unfolded just some months later. It’s clear that Putin goals to enchantment to the extra conservative segments of the Russian inhabitants — and certainly, many Russians maintain culturally conservative views of their on a regular basis lives. However in the end, this conservative messaging serves to masks insurance policies which might be, in lots of respects, deeply anti-conservative.
This is the reason I’d label it as pseudo-conservatism — it mimics conservatism with the clear objective of creating individuals really feel safer in turbulent occasions and fostering satisfaction of their nation and authorities. Nonetheless, in apply, what’s really taking place has little to do with conventional conservatism.
The Kyiv Impartial: We see from right here in Ukraine why individuals like Dugin are so harmful. He has actively referred to as for the genocide of Ukrainian individuals for years — that's what acquired him kicked out of 1 college again in 2014 or 2015, if I'm not mistaken. However what harm has he and others like him inflicted upon Russian academia over the previous decade of battle? What harm can they inflict overseas?
Alexey Zhavoronkov: It's a extremely good query. I feel Dugin's educational trajectory exhibits us that these days, the Russian authorities is severely involved with the difficulty of Russian teachers not being too cooperative, for probably the most half.
There’s a set of statistics from 2022 that breaks down how totally different social teams relate to the battle, whether or not they assist it actively, passively, or oppose it altogether. The group with the least assist for the battle was Russian teachers, which indicators to the federal government that it is a important challenge.
The federal government makes use of numerous means to manage the excessively ‘cosmopolitan’ Russian academia. We see now that pro-government ideologists have been gifted their very own institutes. Dugin now directs the Ivan Ilyin Greater Political Faculty, an institute throughout the Russian State College for Humanities. This, together with different latest insurance policies in schooling, is a sign to Dugin’s colleagues from the identical college and different establishments that they’re now being intently watched. Naturally, this contributes to an environment of paranoia and self-censorship.
This self-censorship didn’t begin in 2022. We do not need onerous statistical knowledge, however we nonetheless have some information from latest historical past, just like the dissolution of the Division for Constitutional Regulation on the Greater Faculty of Economics in Moscow straight after the general public debate regarding the necessity of the 2020 amendments to the Russian structure. This motion was not the federal government’s initiative. The college itself determined to put off main students in constitutional regulation, de facto, as a result of there was no residing structure anymore. The structure was amended in a method that a number of elements of it had been virtually destroyed.
Individuals like Dugin contribute to the deterioration of the general mental local weather and the rise of self-censorship, which, I consider, is even worse than state censorship. In right this moment’s Russia, state censorship is extra about punishing just a few people, whereas the schools punish the opposite 200 individuals themselves out of concern. It's totally different from the Soviet Union, the place state management was stricter and all-encompassing.
Externally, Dugin makes an impression, partly as a result of he has a military of writers, translators, and lots of supporters selling his books in Europe and the U.S. I do know a number of colleagues right here in Germany, for example, who had been excited that there was speculated to be a workshop on Dugin’s philosophy on the Danube Institute in Hungary and wished to attend. Nonetheless, after watching a few of his movies, they began questioning what he was really saying. They realized it wasn’t philosophy however extra like justificatory commentary on the Russian political agenda, crammed with large slogans attempting to align him with present insurance policies. For example, in his speak with John Mearsheimer, Dugin explicitly states that Ukraine ought to have been both impartial or a part of Russia, and now Jap Europe needs to be both impartial or "ours."
Dugin gives the look, externally, that he represents Russian philosophy right this moment and embodies the mental majority amongst his colleagues, which isn’t the case. Nonetheless, he’s the loudest, with all the mandatory assets and devices at his disposal. Whereas he presents himself as a traditionalist, he additionally makes use of capitalist instruments to commercialize his concepts within the West, adapting his views relying on the place he’s. On this method, he jogs my memory of Trump a bit.
If we have a look at a few of the translations of Dugin’s books, just like the German or English variations, it’s putting how a lot he tailors his message to please his European viewers. In Russia, he typically speaks of the ‘collective West’ or Europe as a declining tradition, a tradition that promotes degeneration. However for his German viewers, he or his ghostwriters ready an introduction to certainly one of his main works that claims one thing like this: “Germany has traditionally been oppressed by the U.S., however I, Dugin, am keen on German tradition and thinkers.” Certainly, his Russian publications ceaselessly reference Hegel and Heidegger, though he by no means understands their concepts. Nonetheless, for his Russian viewers, he additionally emphasizes the necessity for authoritarianism and even totalitarianism. When interesting to a German viewers, he avoids such statements, understanding they wouldn't resonate together with his readers there. As an alternative, he tries to enchantment to a broader public, not simply probably the most radical circles, by presenting himself as a German sympathizer.
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Hello, that is Kate Tsurkan, thanks for studying this text. You might need observed that none of our reporting is behind a paywall — that’s as a result of we consider that now, greater than ever, the world wants entry to dependable reporting from the bottom right here in Ukraine. To maintain our journalism going, we depend on our neighborhood of over 20,000 members, most of whom give simply $5 a month. Assist us right this moment.
The Kyiv IndependentKate Tsurkan
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